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Abstract: Nowadays many organisations share sensitive 
services through open network systems and this raises the 
need for an authorization framework that can interoperate 
even when the parties have no pre-existing relationships. 
Trust Negotiation is the process used to establish these first 
relationships, through the transfer of attributes, embedded 
in digital credentials, between the two parties. However, 
these attributes may themselves be considered sensitive and 
so may need protection from disclosure. In some 
environments, the policies that govern the protected services 
may also be considered sensitive and their release to 
arbitrary strangers may leak confidential business 
information. Thus, the electronic services, the policies that 
control access to them, and the digital credentials used to 
gain access may all be sensitive and require access 
protections. This paper describes how to unify the protection 
of services, sensitive credentials and policies in a 
synchronised trustworthy manner. We propose a trust 
authorization framework (TAF) that builds on the 
capabilities of XACML to support the bilateral exchange of 
policies and credentials through trust negotiation. Our 
framework addresses privacy and trust issues, and considers 
services, credentials, and authorization policies protected 
resources whose access is subject to credential proof and 
trust level validation  
 
Keywords: XACML, authorization, privacy 
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1.0 Introduction 
Authorization ensures that resources can be 
accessed only by parties who have the right privileges. Thus, 
the resource gatekeeper requires some level of trust be 
established before sensitive information can be released. 
Service requesters are required to submit sufficient 
authorization credentials before access will be granted. 
Wherever people are involved in the exchange of digital 
information, such as credentials, privacy becomes an issue 
of some concern. The use of personal, sensitive information 
to gain access to a resource in a distributed environment 
raises an interesting paradox. On the one hand, in order to 
make the services and resources accessible to legitimate 
users the authorization infrastructure requires the users’ 
attributes. On the other hand, the users may not be ready to 
disclose their attributes to a remote service provider without 
determining exactly who the provider is and how personal 
attributes will be used. Thus, privacy [1] [2] [7] is a critical 
consideration for authorization environments.  One approach 
for addressing these privacy concerns is to employ a 
bilateral exchange of policies and credentials between the 
parties involved in the transaction, so that they can decide 
what to give and/or get from each other. This process is 
known as trust negotiation in the literature [8]. However, the 
policies and credentials may themselves be sensitive. 
Consider the following motivating example. A Secret 
Service (SS) offers online training both for her agents and 
friendly secret agent services. The service requires that each 
participant present a role Attribute Certificate (certificate), a 
security assertion digitally signed by the participant’s 
security authority which binds the holder’s attributes to the 
holder. Whilst the policy that governs this service prevents 
unauthorized access to its resources, the policy does not 
protect the fact that SS offers training to friendly 
organisations, which is another sensitive piece of business 
information. To address this vulnerability, it is desirable that 
the policy that governs access to the training resources be 
protected from being disclosed to arbitrary strangers. To 
prevent arbitrary disclosure of sensitive policies, access to 
the policies need to be protected. On the other hand, an 
agent requester cannot give out her role certificate to any 
service that poses as the SS webserver.  The agent would 
like some proof that shows the server can be trusted.  
Imperatively, to solve the arbitrary disclosure of sensitive 
policies [2] and digital credentials, parties require a 
mechanism to gradually establish a trusted relationship. 
Trust relationships can be established between service 
providers and requesters through the exchange of 
information in a well understood fashion [12].  The 
information usually contains policies and security assertions, 
issued by Attribute Authorities (AAs), which describe the 
properties of the holders. The exchange of this information 
is done in such a manner that the security assertions are 
unforgeable and can be verified and validated [22]. 
One promising mechanism for this problem is the 
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML),a 
standard created in OASIS [3] that is gaining prominence 
and enjoying wide spread support among major stakeholders 
in authorization technology. This standard defines a general-
purpose, flexible authorization policy language and a 
query/response format.. Though XACML is a rich 
framework, it intentionally does not address how to preserve 
the privacy of authorization entities. For this, we require 
well-defined trust relationships between the participants, but 
first time business partners may not have pre-existing 
relationships. Therefore, a mechanism for gradual building 
of trust is desirable. 
Trust negotiation management systems have been 
proposed by researchers as one effective way to guarantee 
the confidentiality of authorization information. Trust 
establishment is a well researched concept [5] [2] [6]. 
However, existing efforts in this area have not been 
standardized and do not fit into any authorization standard 
such as XACML.  This work investigates how XACML can 
fit into trust authorization management systems. Our 
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approach and strategy is to explore existing concepts, and 
where necessary, extend them to accomplish our goal.  
Adding a trust component to XACML will extend 
its usage in open systems where transaction parties require 
trust establishment before they can share their sensitive 
information. In this paper, we describe our proposed 
XACML Trust Authorization Framework (XTAF). XTAF is 
a loosely coupled architecture with a trust component that 
protects authorization information (policies and credentials) 
layered such that it integrates seamlessly into any XACML 
compliant authorization engine with minimal effort. We 
expose different ways that the XACML policy language can 
be used to support bilateral exchange of policies and 
credentials, and protect unauthorized access to services. We 
introduce a Trust Authorization Service Handler (TASH) to 
handle sensitive authorization information. This supports 
runtime bilateral authorization operations between two or 
more parties. The framework takes care of protecting 
unauthorised access to enterprise resources such that users’ 
privacy is balanced against the business aspects and public 
interests that may be adversely affected by transactions in an 
unregulated privacy regime. Using existing standard such as 
XACML has the benefit of promoting interoperability and 
reducing the effort needed to integrate with existing 
applications.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: In 
section 2, we highlight some of the security challenges in 
open systems authorization. Section 3 gives a brief overview 
of the XACML authorization framework. Section 4 presents 
an overview of the XACML Trust Authorization 
Framework, as well as showing how the XACML policy 
language can be used for trust establishment, privacy, and 
resource controls in a synchronized manner. In section 5 we 
illustrate, through a hypothetical example, the usage of our 
framework based on the concepts presented in this paper. 
Section 6 presents related research work, and section 7 
concludes the paper with a summary and future research 
work. 
2.0 Authorization in Distributed 
Open Systems 
Authorization is the mechanics of controlling 
access to sensitive resources by comparing local policies 
that govern access to resources against the credentials 
submitted by requesters. Traditional authorization is a one-
shot process that requires the user to submit credentials 
unconditionally, irrespective of whether the services adhere 
to the privacy preferences of the users. Traditional 
authorization systems also make an unrealistic assumption 
that service requesters have previous knowledge of access 
control requirements; in open systems with diverse and 
unbounded users and service providers, this may not be the 
case. Consequently, service requesters are made to submit 
more attributes than necessary, which potentially exposes 
them to privacy risks.  Resources can grow and shrink, 
making dynamic disclosure of access control requirements 
desirable at runtime. This makes it possible to add or 
remove services without worrying about the implications for 
service requesters. At request time, the access requirements 
can be made known to service requesters and they can check 
whether they can meet those requirements. Conversely, the 
service requesters need to evaluate the risk of giving out 
their attributes by determining the degree to which they are 
prepared to trust the service providers. 
   Figure 1 gives a simple picture of entities involved 
in authorization process and points of privacy concerns.  To 
enforce privacy in authorization, a loosely coupled 
architecture is required to synchronise the protection of 
business services, as well as users’ privacy in a manner that 
guarantees information flow and availability. It is 
worthwhile to note that these entities may not necessarily 
exist within the same trusted environment. Thus, the 
environment affects the kind of privacy concerns and 
expectations. For instance, with authorization in a 
distributed environment which is conducted over public 
network such as the Internet, the users’ and the service 
providers’ information is exposed to a number of threats. In 
this section, we highlight some of the security challenges of 
authorization particularly in distributed environments. .  
2.1 Security Challenges 
Authorization in distributed open systems presents a 
number of significant challenges. First, the service providers 
and requesters are unlikely to belong to the same security 
domain in all scenarios. In some of these cases, service 
requesters may include users with or without pre-existing 
relationships with the service provider. Second, the 
authorization credentials may not necessarily be issued by 
one Attribute Authority (AA), thus a chain of third parties 
may be involved in the authorization process.  Thus, privacy 
and trust are critical security constructs that must be 





















Policy may contain sensitive















PAP- Policy Administration Point
PIP- Policy Information Point
 3
addressed along side the effective control of service 
providers’ resources. In this context, some of the key 
authorization security issues can be summarized as follows: 
 Service providers’ effective resource control 
 Service requesters’ personal sensitive 
attributes need privacy protection 
 Service providers’ authorization information 
requires privacy protection 
 Privacy of third party affiliates – 
unauthorised disclosure of trust relationship 
between AAs and the credential holders 
 Verification and validation of assertions 
issued by AAs about the service providers 
and requesters 
 When service can be accessed by users with 
or without pre-existing relationship, it is 
desirable to devise an appropriate way to use 
the same authorization engine to deal with 
users across untrusted boundaries.  
 
Authorization in distributed transaction processing 
systems where strangers can engage in business transactions 
without pre-existing relationships requires a gradual trust 
building scheme, so that the parties can release their 
attributes incrementally, while receiving the other party’s 
attributes in an automated and synchronised manner.  In this 
way, the risk to which a party is exposed at any point in the 
negotiation can be minimised. To handle this aspect of 
security requires a trust establishment mechanism.  Thus, the 
XACML Policy Decision Point (PDP) needs to allow the 
automated, gradual, selective release of policies and 
comparison with locally available credential attributes 
during the trust session.  
3.0 The XACML Framework 
 The eXtensible access Control Markup Language 
(XACML) [3] is a general purpose policy language and 
framework that includes common datatypes, functions, and 
decision combining logic, and a query/response format, 
expressed in XML. The XACML standard uses a generic 
access control framework based on the IETF/DMTF model 
that allows an enterprise to specify and deploy an access 
control policy to match its access control requirements for a 
variety of resources. The request/response language 
describes the form of query and answer to flow between the 
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) and Policy Decision Point 
(PDP) during the access control process. The wider 
acceptance of XACML results, apart from its rich 
capabilities, from the benefits of using a framework that can 
interoperate in open systems with minimal effort. Again, the 
XACML standard has defined profiles to integrate and 
interoperate with other security protocols and requirements 
such as SAML [27] and RBAC [28].  Interoperability is 
critical in distributed open systems and can be addressed by 
using and sharing common functionality within a standard 
framework.  
Figure 2 shows a simplified view of the XACML 
authorization framework. The PEP is the mechanism which 
provides access to resources, and which forms access 
requests used to query the PDP. The Requests are 
represented to the PDP through an abstract entity called the 
Context Handler, which provides access to attributes from 
the Request as well as other sources called Policy 
Information Points (PIP). The PDP resolves an applicable 
policy from its Policy Administration Points (PAPs), 
evaluates the policy against the Context, and renders a 
Decision that is passed back to the PEP. 
In this general approach, the PIPs are made to 
submit the requester’s credentials unconditionally or else the 
service cannot be provided. A PIP has no way to verify that 
the service provider can be trusted with the requester’s 
attributes. This provides only a unilateral access control 
scheme, which is not sufficient to protect the privacy of the 
subject. Furthermore, such a one-sided authorization scheme 
cannot address some legal issues, since the service requester 
has no way of guaranteeing or proving that the service 
provider’s privacy statements can be trusted. Thus, the 
requester’s credentials are vulnerable to exploitation and 
abuse. 
3.1 XACML Policy Language 
The XACML policy language structure depicted in 
figure 3 comprises at the top level: PolicySet, Policy 
Combining Algorithm, Target, and Policy.  The PolicySet is 
used to encapsulate a set of Policies and PolicySets. A 
Policy Combining Algorithm is logic that resolves a single 
decision out of multiple decisions (e.g., a single decision of 
Permit overrides any number of decisions to Deny). The 
Target defines simple applicability rules based on the 
Subjects (the attributes of the potential resource requesters), 
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controlled), the Actions (the attributes of the action the 
subject intends to perform on the resources), and the 
Environments (any environmental or unclassifiable values). 
A Policy comprises at the top level two sub-policy 
components: Target and Rule. The Rule element comprises 
an Effect (Permit or Deny), a Target, and an optional 
Condition element, used to express the evaluation logic. 
The XACML PolicySet can be considered as a tree, 
which contains one or more children: PolicySet or Policy. A 
policy in turn contains one or more child elements: Rule.  In 
an authorization process, the Target at each level in the tree 
acts as a pre-condition for evaluating that part of the tree.  If 
a PolicySet Target is false, then none of the child Policies or 
PolicySets are evaluated and the process returns “Not 
Applicable” for that branch of the tree.   
When matching Resource values in a Target, the 
attributes of the Resources can match any of the Resource 
Types the underlying policy governs. In our case, the 
resource can be a credential attribute, a computing resource, 
or a policy. If the resource match is a policy, then the policy 
is considered sensitive and is not to be disclosed to arbitrary 
strangers. To allow disclosure of the policy, subjects must 
show sufficient credential attributes to satisfy the policy 
governing the protected policy.  
   
According to the XACML 2.0 specification, a PEP 
SHALL grant access to the protected resources only if a 
valid XACML Response Decision of “Permit” is returned by 
the PDP. Conversely, the default behaviour of a PEP is that 
it SHALL deny access to the protected resources in all other 
cases of XACML, including “Indeterminate”. In XACML a 
Request SHALL be evaluated as “Indeterminate” if the PDP 
is “unable to evaluate the requested access”. XACML 
interprets this behaviour in many ways, including cases such 
as missing attributes, network errors while retrieving 
policies, syntax errors in the decision request or in the 
policy, etc.  In privacy aware environments, where entities 
are not sure whether the remote party can be trusted, they 
may not include their sensitive attributes initially in the 
service access Request(s). This can result in an 
“Indeterminate” response if the PIP is unable to supply 
them, which can be interpreted as an indicator to negotiate 
for the values. This behaviour can be leveraged to enable 
privacy and trust by controlling access to the attributes in the 
PIP. 
4.0 XACML Trust Authorization 
Framework (XTAF) 
 Simultaneously, to protect the privacy of parties in 
a transaction and to control access to a service provider’s 
resources, an architecture is required that can support trust 
and confidentiality at the same time. Access control 
techniques can be used to protect access to a party’s 
credentials, but to establish trust requires a gradual and 
progressive approach in the exchange of a party’s 
credentials. To enable trust and privacy, a bilateral process 
will empower both parties to use access control policies to 
determine the way their attributes are given to each other.  
This approach brings flexibility into the way privacy is 
protected, so that parties can explicitly specify who, how 
and when their credentials can be disclosed to others. Thus, 
with trust negotiation, the exchange of policies and 
credentials must be repeated several times as trust is 
progressively increased. But in order to know which 
credentials to release, a subject must be sent a policy of the 
resource. If the subject is happy with the policy, it will 
release further credentials. To address the privacy concerns 
of both parties, we adopt a model in which the client and 
server exchange sensitive credentials only after they know 
that they are talking to the right party. To enable fine- 
grained privacy control of sensitive information, we adopt 
selective and progressive exchange of policies and 
credentials, so that they can incrementally and sufficiently 
learn about each other. This will allow each party to 
determine what the other party proposes to do with their 
sensitive resources.  Rather than taking all the risk of 
releasing sensitive attributes at once, parties are subject to 
smaller risk on an incremental basis and are able to 
withdraw at any point.                                 
 




















4.1 Trust Authorization Architecture 
Figure 4 shows the basic building block of a Trust 
Authorization Service Handler (TASH), a component added 
to the core XACML model to address the aspects of privacy 
and trust in distributed authorization environments. This 
service is being implemented as a Trust Negotiation (TN) 
server and SunXACML Attribute Finder Module (AFM) 
[21] concept will interface it with core XACML engine. The 
Negotiation Protocol Module (NPM) handles the trust 
negotiation protocols and ordering of messages [12] during 
the building of a trust relationship. The Attribute Validation 
Engine (AVE) verifies and validates every credential 
attribute and policy that is received by the system before 
passing it to the trust decision engine. The Trust Information 
Handler (TIH) is responsible for the canonical representation 
of the inputs consumed by the TrustPDP and the outputs 
from it.  
The TrustPDP handles trust access management decisions 
by comparing local policies with received credentials and 
received policies with local credentials. The local policies 
say what local resources (policies and credentials) can be 
unlocked by the received credentials. The received policies 
say what will become available by releasing further local 
credentials. The TrustPDP performs access management 
decisions in two ways: 
 It checks if there are any local credentials (and 
policies) that can be disclosed by comparing the 
received credentials with the local policy. This is a 
necessary but not sufficient step for releasing 
further local credentials (and policies). It means 
that the remote party is sufficiently trusted to 
receive them. 
 It checks the received policy to see if there is 
sufficient benefit to be gained from releasing 
further local credentials. When the recipient is a 
human user, he or she can be asked to make a 
decision. When the recipient is a service being 
accessed by a user, then there may be no received 
policy but it is still beneficial to the service to 
release further local credentials and policies. 
 
Figure 5 depicts the high level architecture for how our 
proposed XTAF can perform trust negotiation in order to 
preserve the service requester’s privacy and control access 
to the enterprise’s services. Theoretically, as seen in figure 
5, the TASH replaces the PIP in figure 2. In this way the 
TASH serves as a gatekeeper to the attribute store and filters 
all requests for authorization information. The two parties in 
the authorization course require a TASH at both endpoints 
to engage in a trust building session until trust is or fails to 
be established. The XACML standard specifies that the PDP 
shall request Attribute Values from the ContextHandler. 
Then, the ContextHandler can query the PIP for the 
attributes. This provision makes it possible to layer TASH to 
work seamlessly with the access control engine in a manner 
that privacy and trust are enabled. What follows is a 
simplified illustration of how a client can preserve its 
privacy while requesting access to a service that requires its 
credentials. In step 1, Alice, sends a request for a particular 
service to Bob, and the request has missing or insufficient 
Subject credentials. The PDP attempts to evaluate the 
request, and during evaluation calls its ContextHandler to 
retrieve attributes, as shown by step2. The TASH uses the 
parameters passed by the ContextHandler to contact a 
similar TASH in Alice’s domain or sends its TASH details 
via Alice’s client to get a TN session credential, as depicted 
in step 4. Note that step 4 can take any number of rounds 
provided trust negotiation can advance through the 
exchanges of policies and credentials.  If the session is 
successful, Bob’s TASH returns a “TN successful” session 
credential with the attributes requested to Bob’s 
ContextHndler which passes the attributes to his PDP, which 
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4.2 XACML Trust Policy Set 
 We examine two ways in which the XACML 
policy language can be used to form an effective Trust 
Negotiation Policy Set. One approach is to use the existing 
PolicySet provision depicted in figure 6a, which can contain 
one or more PolicySets or Policies. We mentioned in section 
3.1 that PolicySet is a tree, which can contain other trees. 
Each Target at any node of the tree is an intersection of 
Targets in the path that leads to that branch of the tree. 
During the policy evaluation, an ancestor Target is a pre-
condition for evaluating a descendant Target. Thus, a 
PolicySet Target can be specified as a pre-condition for 
disclosing any part of the policies contained in that 
PolicySet. We give a simple example here. 
 Alice wants to access webserver1. Access to this 
service is defined by policy p2, which specifies that an 
accessor must be a postgraduate student in the computing 
department of the University of Salford. We assume that p2 
is considered sensitive, so that its disclosure is controlled by 
policy p1. p1 specifies that to read policy p2, the requester 
must be a registered student of the  University of Salford. 
Alice is unwilling to give up her postgraduate role certificate 
without determining whether the webserver can be trusted 
with her attributes. 
 We can implicitly place the requirement of p1 in 
the PolicySet Target and the requirement of p2 in a Policy 
Rule element. In this simple example, p2 is disclosed only if 
p1 (in this case, the PolicySet Target) is evaluated to true. 
For instance, in figure 6a, PolicySet combines Policies Id1, 
2...n. The PolicySet Target is a pre-condition for the 
evaluation of all the Policies or PolicySets contained in that 
PolicySet. The Policy Target is a pre-condition for the 
evaluation of all the Rules in that Policy. If PolicySet Target 
evaluates to false, then none of the Policies are evaluated. 
Likewise, if the Policy Target evaluates to false, then none 
of the Rules in the Policy can be evaluated. Each Policy in 
the PolicySet has a Target element and may have a number 
of Rule Targets, n. So if we assume that policies Id1, 2, ..n 
are a Trust Policy Set, in a trust session, the PolicySet 
Target will be evaluated as a pre-condition, in addition to 
each  Policy Target as another pre-condition, as well as the 
evaluation of each Rule Target in the Policy. Thus, the 
concept of PolicySet, in theory can be used to construct 
effective Trust Negotiation Policy sets. The PolicySet can be 
used to define complex access control requirements that can 
support trust negotiation sessions. 
 Usually, in the trust negotiation domain, access 
control policies are arranged as directed policy graphs or 
trees [12]. It is apparent that the Target at any level is a pre-
condition for evaluating that branch of the policy tree and 
for continuing to processing the other parts of the policy 
tree. This ensures that if the Target at any level evaluates to 
false, evaluating that branch of the tree becomes needless 
and negotiation can fail. The main drawback of this 
approach is that the structure maintains a strict hierarchy 
which may not be flexible enough to represent all conditions 
for trust building.  
A second approach is to leverage the Rule RuleId 
attribute of the Policy Rule as shown in figure 6b. In this 
case, a Rule can be made to point to another Rule in order to 
protect that Rule from disclosure to arbitrary strangers. This 
model addresses the problems raised by the first approach, 
but may require the inclusion of a rule combining algorithm. 
However, additional constraints can be enforced in each rule 
by using the XACML Conditions and Obligations without 
extending the language.  We adopt this approach as an 























efficient way to construct a simple effective trust policy set. 
In some environments, the first approach can be more 
effective, especially where policies are defined by a 
hierarchy of authorities to protect authorization information 
flow. 
At trust session runtime, the TASH builds a 
disclosure Trust Policy Set from applicable policies to form 
the Trust Policy Layers, from which it can infer the 
hierarchy of disclosure policies setting the source and sink 
nodes [14]. Once this is determined, the TASH can use the 
information deduced from the hierarchy to progressively 
negotiate trust with a remote party. The nodes satisfied 
during the negotiation phase are eliminated until the sink 
node (last layer) is satisfied or the session terminates. The 
ordering and sequence of the messages are important for the 
building of trust and confidentiality. This determines the 
trust level and what each party is ready to give in exchange 
of his own information.  
5.0 Example Scenario 
In this example we show how a CIA agent can 
surreptitiously gain access to a CIA web service that is 
hidden behind a publicly accessible service. Alice, the CIA 
agent, asks for http://www.cia.gv/training/ but is unwilling 
to give up her CIA X509 Attribute certificate until she is 
confident that she is communicating with a CIA server. But 
the server wishes to protect the disclosure of this access 
requirement to arbitrary strangers, redirects Alice to satisfy 
other requirements, and negotiation starts. 
We describe the relevant Trust Policy using Policy 
Rule containers to define access requirements such that 
sensitive rules are protected from arbitrary disclosure, as 
well as the control of unauthorized access to the web 
services. What follows is the description of the web service 
Policy in plain English (figure 7a is a fragment of the 
policy).1) Rule 4 states that a requester (Subject) with 
attribute CIA X509 certificate can read (Action) the training 
documents (Resource). (Details not shown.). 2) Rule 3 says 
that a requester with attribute US government employee 
certificate can be given access to: the access requirement for 
Rule 4; the CIA server certificate; and the resource 
http://www.us.govt.gv/. 3) Rule 2 states that a requester with 
the attribute US citizenship certificate can see the access 
requirement for Rule 3 and the US government server 
certificate, as well as access the resource 
http://www.us.public.gv/.  4) Rule 1 says anyone can access 
http://www.us-gen-public.gv/ and see the access 
requirements of Rule 2. 
Conversely, Alice’s Attribute Release Policies 
(ARPs) define the requirements for accessing her digital 
attribute certificates  as follows (see Figure 7b): 1) Rule 4 
states that only CIA certified servers can be permitted to see  
her CIA agent certificate. 2) Rule 3 says that the access 
requirement for Rule 4 can only be seen by US government 
certified servers. 3) Rule 2 states that only certified US 
public servers can see her government employment 
certificate and view the access requirement for Rule 3.  4) 
Rule1 states that any requester can be shown the access 
requirement for Rule 2.  From this example, it can be seen 
that the rules can form a chain defining the order in which 
they must be disclosed and evaluated in a progressive 
manner.   
At any particular stage in the negotiation, each 
party must release information to allow the negotiation to 
move to the next stage. For example, in order to see the 
access requirement for the CIA training resources Alice 
must prove that she is a US government employee. Proving 
this will also allow Alice to see the server’s CIA server 


























certificate, which satisfies her ARP regarding release of her 
CIA Agent Certificate. In this way, the negotiation proceeds 
in increments until Alice finally gains access to the training 
resource.  
In principle, the operation of the native XACML 
authorization engine is synchronized with its TN server in 
such a way that the engine’s information is visible to the TN 
server.  Figure 8 illustrates how the negotiation is performed 
iteratively to build trust, protect privacy and gain access to 
the training service. 
5.1 Discussions 
 Our example shows how hierarchical resources can 
be protected and how, at the same time, building of trust 
may be enabled to adequately protect the privacy of 
authorization information. The secret agent requested the 
training resources, but the server redirected the request to 
initiate a trust building session. Theoretically, a native 
XACML PDP asks its ContextHandler for the attributes 
which were not submitted in the initial request context. In 
our case, the ContextHandler contacts the TN server and a 
trust session can start.  However, this approach requires that 
negotiators must possess other credentials that can be used 
incrementally to satisfy successive access control 
requirements. Arguably, the incremental attribute release 
technique can also be used to hinder replay attacks [17]. In 
this sense, for an adversary to launch replay attacks, he must 
cache all the credential sets in order to succeed.   
 Figure 8 presents the naïve trust negotiation 
session. Alice is always seen issuing her privacy policies 
and credentials that are unlocked by the credentials provided 
by the server. Alice always requires the server to provide 
credentials before she gives hers. Similarly the server 
releases policies and credentials that are unlocked by Alice’s 
credentials. The difference is that the server must have a 
credential it is willing to release to the public before TN can 
start. What is important is that the parties must co-operate 
enough for trust to succeed whenever possible or fail 
gracefully. The decision on whether to release credentials or 
disclose policy depends on the access control policies and 
the relationships between them. In [15] it was mentioned 
that policy disclosures are vulnerable to probing attacks. As 
a result an adversary can use policy disclosure techniques to 
learn of a party’s possession or non-possession of the 
information being asked for.  It is also possible for an 
attacker to lie by expressing constraints on credentials or 
services that (s)he does not possess in order to gather 
information from the attacked. In our example scenario, we 
have shown how these pitfalls are addressed by a finer trust 
policy layering. The example illustrates how Alice – a CIA 
agent - can surreptitiously gain access to CIA online training 
resources. Alice is not prepared to push her 
CIA.agent.certificate to the server and the server is not ready 
to disclose the policy that governs the training resources and 
CIA.server.certificate to arbitrary strangers.  Thus, Alice’s 
request to http://www.cia.gv/training/ is redirected to a TN 
session. From this example, the constraints in the first round 
of policy and credential disclosures on both sides can be 
reduced to: 
       
It is apparent therefore that the first round of trust 
negotiation which asked for the Where Are You From 
certificates are not tightly coupled to any of the sensitive 
resources: http://www.cia.gv/training/, CIA.server.certificate 
and Alice’s CIA.agent.certificate. The assumption is that the 
kick-off policies cannot explicitly reveal whether both 
parties possess the required credentials or services. This 
suggests that both Alice’s and the server's behaviour cannot 
reveal non-possession or possession at the first round of 
iteration.  Again, if the server gives out WAYF.certificate 
and Alice fails to respond with credentials that can satisfy 
the server’s disclosure policy, the negotiation can fail at this 
point.  What is important is that whenever trust is to 
succeed, it is desirable that policy and credential flow should 
advance the level of trust, which minimizes the effect of 
probing attack or lying under false policy expression. The 
major drawback here is that negotiators are required to 
possess a set of credentials (but this natural) in order that 
access control policies can be used to address the order in 
which those credentials can be released to advance the trust 
building session.  
6 Related Works  
 Seamons et el [15] [16] [13] [14] and Bertino et el 
[6] [8] have done useful works in the area of Trust 
Negotiation and Management.  Their work provides good 
theoretical background on the concepts of trust with quite a 
number of implementation scenarios.  Seamons et el had 
advanced the notion of trust negotiation protocol and 
strategy with some practical demonstration of how they can 
be implemented [12]. In the area of trust policy and 
language, Bertino et el have proposed a number of ways to 
encode policies and credentials [6]. Their various works on 
privacy during trust negotiation have had considerable 
influence on our work [15]. Their various works are 
Subject.AttributeValue WAYF.certificate

















proprietary and cannot interoperate; this is where the 
XACML framework, an open standard, is gaining 
prominence with great potentials. 
 Lorch et el presented their first experience using 
XCAML in distributed systems. Their work included the 
analysis of the performance of XACML with existing 
models and highlighted its limitations.  They drew the 
experienc gained in the integration of SAML and XACML 
in distributed open systems and performance results.  Lorch 
et el presented how the PRIMA model [19] leveraged 
XACML to express policy requirements. PRIMA is 
specifically designed for access control in grid computing 
environments; users can assign and/or delegate privileges to 
each other without involving policy administrators. 
However, Lorch et el focused mainly on the analysis of 
XACML’s performance and did not address the privacy 
issues and trustworthiness in distributed environments.  Our 
work is among the first to look into how XACML can be 
used to build trust relationship in distributed authorization 
environments. This is a significant direction since XACML 
is a generic access control model that has continued to 
address wider access control requirements.  
The Shibboleth infrastructure, in an attempt to 
address privacy in an authorization environment, proposed 
two kinds of policies: Attribute Release Policy (ARP) and 
Attribute Acceptance Policy (AAP) [20]. Shibboleth is a 
distributed authentication and authorization architecture 
whose access control is based on users' attributes. 
Shibboleth provides an Attribute Release Policy (ARP) on 
the users' home site and an Attribute Acceptance Policy 
(AAP) on the resource target site to protect users' privacy. 
Although Shibboleth provided a means by which both users 
and attribute authorities [20] could express their privacy 
preferences at the home site, all users coming from different 
sites visiting one target resource site may have the same 
AAP of that target site. Privacy in Shibboleth is primarily 
focused on using pseudonymity; however the use of 
pseudonymity does not completely protect privacy in an 
environment where the user may give other attributes in the 
cause of using the authorised resources. For instance, an 
institution may give a student a signed assertion to access a 
discount online bookshop, which is the required 
authorization token. But if the student wants to purchase a 
book, (s)he needs to provide other personal attributes such 
as credit card number, physical address for payment and 
delivery. Shibboleth's provisions for privacy still fall under a 
one-shot process: the parties in transaction cannot determine 
if a party can be trusted with sensitive attributes. Lorch et el 
[4] pointed out the current effort being made at Sun 
Microsystems and Brown University to integrate Shibboleth 
with XACML. This work used WSPL, a profile of XACML 
that supports policy intersection to determine if two policies 
are mutually amenable. This approach requires some policy 
on the server side be released without negotiation, but then 
provides a very simple means for calculating what the client 
is willing to share.  
PERMIS [11] [22] is a middleware authorization 
framework which focuses mainly on the RBAC access 
control model. PERMIS has successfully been implemented 
in a number of application scenarios with interesting results 
[23] [24] [22]. It fully supports role hierarchy and its policy 
language is user friendly. It has a proprietary GUI policy 
editing tool [25] and Privilege Allocation (PA) subsystems 
for managing roles and permissions. The PERMIS language 
is limited in expressions and semantics compared to 
XACML which is very expressive with significant 
functionality. The PERMIS framework does not provide 
direct support for bilateral exchange of policies and 
credentials to address privacy issue and trustworthiness in a 
manner presented in this paper. The concepts presented in 
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this paper could be implemented using the PERMIS 
authorization model. PERMIS has in its architecture a 
subsystem that signs, verifies and validates X.509 attribute 
certificates used to represent authorization credentials in 
PERMIS model. However, to use our framework in 
PERMIS requires the introduction of a trust layer and the 
inclusion of identifiers in the Target Access Policy (TAP) 
element, so that a TAP can protect another TAP to form 
effective trust policy set.  
7. Conclusion and Future Work 
 This paper proposes a way that the widely accepted 
XACML standard can address three essential security 
components: trust, privacy and service control in a 
synchronised manner. It identifies some of the necessary 
additions to core XAML model that allow for progressive 
bilateral exchange of policies and credentials between two 
parties in a way that privacy and trust are sufficiently 
preserved while protecting access to sensitive services.  We 
have leveraged trust concepts already proposed by 
researchers and demonstrated how our model can protect 
hierarchical resources at the same time.  
In particular, we examined the various ways that 
the XACML language can be used in trust negotiation and 
proposed how to construct effective trust policy sets which 
can optimize trust establishment sessions. We have proposed 
a trust layer in the primitive XACML model for gradual 
building of trust relationships, so that multiple parties can 
engage in secure, trusted transactions. The trust layer 
includes NPM that implements trust protocols and controls 
the way messages are exchanged, and the TrustPDP which 
handles trust management decisions. Additionally, we have 
introduced the trust session handle (tsh), an optional 
parameter included in the AttributeStatement which controls 
the way a TN server is invoked by the native XACML 
authorization engine.  The concepts discussed in this paper 
are being implemented using the SunXACML 
implementation [21] and the PERMIS Attribute Verifier 
subsystem. 
 Our approach has the capabilities to protect 
complex hierarchical resources and policies, which will 
guarantee a finer control of sensitive services. It provides the 
flexibility to leverage a common framework for all the 
authorization needs and lessen the burden in administrative 
requirements. Interoperability is promoted among strangers 
without trust relationships whilst sharing sensitive business 
information. In our approach, we have a loosely coupled 
architecture which provides flexibility in the way trust, 
privacy, and services are protected synchronously. In this 
way, if the client chooses to store credentials locally, a light-
weight Trust Establishment Engine can be deployed without 
losing most of the functionality of an authorization 
mechanism. 
  Though policy disclosure during trust negotiation 
is vulnerable to probing attacks, we have demonstrated how 
our progressive policy and credential disclosures can 
minimize this threat. That is, the progressive and 
incremental paradigm allows the risk to be managed such 
that exposure to risk at any particular point is limited. Again, 
since the Trust level X determines what each party can 
disclose, it is arguable that not much sensitive information is 
lost during establishment of trust using our framework. 
Though Seamons et el proposed the use of a dynamic policy 
graph through policy transforming agents to address this 
problem, which is similar to a static finer granularity in 
policy expressiveness, we did not consider that adding 
additional computational overhead is a better way to address 
the problem. The system presented in this paper can be 
adapted to an existing suite of negotiation strategy to allow 
participants the option of selecting how fast they can 
establish trust.  
Presently, we are looking into how to include 
SAML interfaces to handle the trust message contexts [27]. 
The SAML schema provides information to identify and 
validate the content of assertions such as needed in the trust 
negotiation sessions. Already, XACML version 2 has a 
SAML 2.0 profile which describes its interface with 
XACML. We are also looking into how to address the need-
to-know principle, so that only the relevant credentials that 
contribute towards the client’s stated goals are exchanged 
between the client and the server. Our goal is to find more 
practical approaches in the way policies and credentials are 
exchanged without too much computational overhead. 
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